Why LinuxGuard
The tools you already run weren't built for Linux identity
Your existing security stack watches endpoints, logs, and the directory. The identity layer that actually governs your Linux estate lives somewhere none of them can see.
Sudo rules, SSH keys, local and service accounts, PAM — the artefacts that decide who can do what on your servers sit below the directory and outside the log stream. LinuxGuard makes every one of them known, governed, and continuously assured.
Linux Identity Security Posture
Where LinuxGuard sits — the identity layer beneath your existing stack.
Linux identity risk is not an endpoint problem or a directory problem — it is an OS-level posture problem. LinuxGuard secures that layer continuously, inside the preemptive-cybersecurity trend analysts have been mapping, not as another point-in-time scan.
- Identity Security Posture Management (ISPM) for the Linux estate — continuous posture, not a point-in-time scan.
- ITDR for Linux — identity threat detection and response at the OS layer, built for the Linux threat surface rather than adapted from an endpoint tool.
- Aligned with Gartner's IVIP visibility framework: data · relationships · configuration · posture — every identity mapped, not just logged.
- KuppingerCole Identity Fabric — infrastructure layer complete — Linux OS identities are an explicit Fabric component; LinuxGuard closes the gap most IAM stacks leave open.
Why LinuxGuard?
Generalist security tools weren't built for Linux identity. Here's what that gap looks like in practice.
Complete inventory of all Linux users, groups, service accounts
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Possible but slow; server-by-server
- Vulnerability Scanner
- Not designed for this
- PAM Platform
- Managed accounts only; not full estate
- LinuxGuard
- Continuous, always-current inventory
Sudo rule analysis and NOPASSWD risk identification
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Requires scripting skill; inconsistent
- Vulnerability Scanner
- Out of scope
- PAM Platform
- Not a PAM function
- LinuxGuard
- Complete sudoers parsing and risk scoring
SSH key audit (shared, unrotated, orphaned)
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Manual; easy to miss cross-server relationships
- Vulnerability Scanner
- Out of scope
- PAM Platform
- Managed vaulted keys only
- LinuxGuard
- Cross-fleet SSH key mapping
Privilege escalation path detection (GTFOBins, setuid)
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Requires red-team skill
- Vulnerability Scanner
- CVEs only; no path analysis
- PAM Platform
- Out of scope
- LinuxGuard
- Multi-hop escalation path analysis
Compliance evidence mapped to NIS2/DORA/CIS/SOC 2
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Requires framework mapping expertise
- Vulnerability Scanner
- Raw scan output; not mapped
- PAM Platform
- Session logs; not identity posture
- LinuxGuard
- Structured, auditor-ready, control-mapped
Board/auditor-ready report
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Spreadsheet + screenshots
- Vulnerability Scanner
- Technical scan output
- PAM Platform
- Session management reports
- LinuxGuard
- Executive and technical report included
Continuous monitoring (post-pilot drift detection)
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Requires ongoing internal resource
- Vulnerability Scanner
- Scheduled scans only
- PAM Platform
- Session monitoring only
- LinuxGuard
- 1.2-second change detection
Fixed scope and fixed cost
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Variable; depends on estate size and skill
- Vulnerability Scanner
- Tool cost + internal time
- PAM Platform
- High licensing + professional services
- LinuxGuard
- Fixed-fee pilot — €24,000
Time to actionable results
- Manual / Internal Effort
- Weeks to months
- Vulnerability Scanner
- Fast scan, slow remediation
- PAM Platform
- Months to deploy and baseline
- LinuxGuard
- Immediate, continuously updated
| What's Needed | Manual/Internal Effort | Vulnerability Scanner | PAM Platform | LinuxGuard |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Complete inventory of all Linux users, groups, service accounts | Possible but slow; server-by-server | Not designed for this | Managed accounts only; not full estate | Continuous, always-current inventory |
| Sudo rule analysis and NOPASSWD risk identification | Requires scripting skill; inconsistent | Out of scope | Not a PAM function | Complete sudoers parsing and risk scoring |
| SSH key audit (shared, unrotated, orphaned) | Manual; easy to miss cross-server relationships | Out of scope | Managed vaulted keys only | Cross-fleet SSH key mapping |
| Privilege escalation path detection (GTFOBins, setuid) | Requires red-team skill | CVEs only; no path analysis | Out of scope | Multi-hop escalation path analysis |
| Compliance evidence mapped to NIS2/DORA/CIS/SOC 2 | Requires framework mapping expertise | Raw scan output; not mapped | Session logs; not identity posture | Structured, auditor-ready, control-mapped |
| Board/auditor-ready report | Spreadsheet + screenshots | Technical scan output | Session management reports | Executive and technical report included |
| Continuous monitoring (post-pilot drift detection) | Requires ongoing internal resource | Scheduled scans only | Session monitoring only | 1.2-second change detection |
| Fixed scope and fixed cost | Variable; depends on estate size and skill | Tool cost + internal time | High licensing + professional services | Fixed-fee pilot — €24,000 |
| Time to actionable results | Weeks to months | Fast scan, slow remediation | Months to deploy and baseline | Immediate, continuously updated |
But doesn't my existing stack already cover this?
But my IGA tool already covers Linux…
IGA governs the directory plane — it manages joiner/mover/leaver workflows against AD, LDAP, or your HR system, and it does that well. What it cannot do is read the host. Local accounts, service accounts, sudoers drop-ins, authorized_keys files, and PAM module chains are not provisioned through the directory; they exist below it, on the servers themselves. IGA will never flag a NOPASSWD sudo rule or an orphaned local account, because those artefacts were never part of the workflow it manages.
But my SIEM already covers Linux…
A SIEM answers the question of who logged in, and when. That is a different question from what can each identity actually do. Standing privilege — the sudo rules, SSH key relationships, and escalation paths that define your real attack surface — is configuration state at rest. It generates no events until it is abused, and a log stream cannot reconstruct it after the fact, no matter how far back you retain. LinuxGuard maps that state before any event occurs.
But my EDR/XDR already covers Linux…
EDR and XDR are excellent at what they were built for: detecting anomalous behaviour once a process runs. The problem is that Linux identity risk is not a behavioural event — it is a configuration fact. Which service accounts can escalate to root, which SSH keys are shared across ten servers, which sudoers rules grant passwordless access to the entire fleet: none of that is a process. It is the posture that determines what an attacker can do the moment they land. EDR does not see it.
But my Cloud IAM / Active Directory already covers Linux…
Cloud IAM and Active Directory govern the identity and console plane — authentication at the directory level. Linux identity lives one layer down, on the hosts themselves: local users, groups, sudoers files, SSH keys, and PAM configuration all sit below the directory boundary and persist independently of it. Disabling a directory account does not remove a local account or revoke an authorized_keys entry. What happens on the server after login is governed entirely by artefacts the directory has never seen.
But we run periodic manual reviews…
Manual reviews find the state of a fraction of the fleet at a single point in time — and that state is already ageing by the time the report is written. Privilege creep does not wait for the next review cycle: a developer gets added to sudoers for one deployment and is never removed; a service account granted access for a migration outlives the project by months; an SSH key remains in authorized_keys long after the person who owned it has left. Continuous assurance sees every change, across every host, as it happens — not a quarterly snapshot of a subset.
But my vulnerability scanner already flags this…
Vulnerability scanners look for known software weaknesses: unpatched packages, exposed services, missing patches against published CVEs. Linux identity risk is none of those things. A NOPASSWD sudo rule, an unrotated SSH key shared across fifteen servers, or a service account with direct root access is a configuration and relationship problem — it carries no CVE, it appears on no patch list, and no scanner will ever surface it. It is invisible to that class of tool by design.
But we're already running a PAM platform…
PAM platforms record and control privileged sessions — they are the gate through which approved sessions are meant to pass. But they only govern what flows through them. Local accounts, service accounts configured to bypass PAM, SSH keys that authenticate directly to the host, and sudo rules that escalate without a brokered session all operate outside that perimeter. LinuxGuard maps the identity posture that exists on the host regardless of how access was obtained — so you can see what your PAM platform does not broker, and close those paths.
But our Linux estate is small — is it still a problem?
Fleet size determines the scale of the exposure, not its existence. A single server with an orphaned NOPASSWD sudo rule, an unrotated shared SSH key, or a service account running as root carries the same privilege risk as the same misconfiguration across a thousand servers. The difference is that a small estate is often less reviewed precisely because it is considered low risk. LinuxGuard gives you the same continuous visibility regardless of scale — because a blind spot is a blind spot whether it appears once or a thousand times.
But we're in the cloud — does this still apply?
Cloud infrastructure runs on Linux. Every EC2 instance, every containerised workload, every managed Kubernetes node has an OS-level identity layer beneath the cloud IAM controls your team manages from the console. Cloud IAM governs the AWS, Azure, or GCP plane; it does not govern the local accounts, sudoers files, SSH keys, and PAM configuration on the instances themselves. The Linux identity layer follows your workloads wherever they run — on-premises, cloud, or hybrid.
But compliance auditors haven't flagged this…
Auditors assess against the controls they are scoped to test, and Linux OS-level identity is rarely in scope for a standard IGA, access management, or cloud security review. That absence from the audit scope does not mean the risk is absent — it means it has not been looked at. Regulators under NIS2, DORA, and equivalent frameworks are increasingly explicit that privileged access governance must extend to the full identity surface, not just directory-provisioned accounts. If your Linux estate is not in scope today, that is unlikely to remain the case.
See what your stack has been missing.
Bring your Linux estate into view — every account, key, sudo rule, and PAM path, known and continuously assured. Book a demo and we'll show you the identity layer your existing tools can't.